I would like to try to tackle a little bit of what Sakai calls modern subjectivity, which he has taken from Kant. He writes: “Most of Japanese philosophical discourse on the subject, the self and the ego in the 1920s and 1930s assumed the basic understanding of modern subjectivity, the Kantian formula of the split between the empirical ego and the transcendental ego: only as long as the ‘I’, the knowing subject, cannot be determined can the ‘me’ as the an empirical ego be known as an object of experience” (484). So, as we have already discussed in previously weeks, Sakai is also talking about what Foucault calls the “empirico-transcendental doublet.” The empirical subject—that is, taking yourself as a possible field of study, or the birth of anthropology—can only be said to exist when the transcendent subject remains in obscurity.
I’m not quite sure I understand what this obscurity brings to the table other than if it was not obscure, it would necessarily fall into the realm of the empirical ego, and there would be no “outside” or “knowing” subjectivity that could categorize and theorize concrete, or empirical existence. It’s as if, in order to get out of the contradiction that one cannot conceive of oneself as both subject and object, Kant has invented an ego split. That is to say, there is one part of you that can be the object of empirical study while another part of you that stays outside of the realm of scientific observation. In short, your transcendent ego.
So, modern subjectivity is then necessarily schizophrenic in that there are two egos in any one person. From what I gather from the rest of the argument, this split in egos allows a self-reflexivity on the part of the subject (it can conceive of itself as a knowing ‘I’ as well as an object of observation that can be fit into Foucault’s modern episteme). Indeed, one could posit schizophrenia as the extreme form of self-reflexivity—one self always questioning the other self etc.
But how does this relate to Sakai’s argument about Japanese imperial nationalism? I think that this self-reflexivity, or self-awareness allows for Tanabe to say that in order to be a part of a species—which is biological referent for nationality—you must be capable of choosing NOT to disassociate yourself with the given community. Here is where the logic gets all inverted when he talks about the role of negativity.
This is what I think he’s saying: In order to observe your empirical ‘I’ as a part of a particular nationality, you have to be able to “freely choose” not to disassociate with a particular nationality (or just freely choose to associate with a particular nationality, but somehow the positive formulation of it misses the importance of some dialectical process). In other words, you appeal to your transcendental ‘I’, which for Kant (I think) meant the realm in which free will existed, in order to get the justification for choosing to participate in a given nationality. This is the negation of the species/nationality by appealing to a higher source of validation. By freely choosing, with your transcendental ‘I’—which is just another way to describe Tanabe’s notion of appealing to God to “prevent the state form deviating from truth and justice”— you can conceive of your empirical ‘I’ as part of a particular nationality. In short, submitting the state to “God” means submitting the state to your transcendental ‘I’, which means being able to have the self-awareness/reflexivity of modern subjectivity. This also means that anyone can be a true Japanese nationalist, regardless of your ethnicity, geographic origin etc.
This gets us out of ethnic and geographic determinism of who can and cannot be a Japanese imperial nationalist. Although, my one question--and this might be related to anti-imperial movements across the board--is, what happens when the transcendental 'I' says, "Hell no, I don't want to be a Japanese imperial nationalist!"? Who says that by negating the species/nationality by self-reflexively questioning it will automatically lead to your active participation in it?
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